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People v. Hicks: Sentencing Laws and 
Sex Offenses - A Disingenuous 
Approach by the California Supreme 
Court* 
The California Legislature, over the past two decades, has been 
developing a stiffer penal system in regards to the sentencing of sex 
offenders. The California Supreme Court, during the 1980s, has 
eagerly followed suit and, through the use of judicial interpretation, 
has extended these sentencing statutes to their outermost limits. 
However, over the past five years and, more recently, in December 
1993, the California Supreme Court has exceeded the interpretive 
limits of the sex offender sentencing statutes. The court, in People 
v. Hicks, held that sex offenders are subject to multiple full-term 
consecutive sentences for both non-sex and sex offenses in spite of 
the potentially applicable statutory prohibition regarding multiple 
punishment. This holding abuses the courts interpretive authority 
and opens the door to a potential dramatic increase in sentences 
that the legislature never intended. · 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly over the past decade, a main focus of the United States 
* The student author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and assistance of 
Professor Jean Montoya. 
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criminal justice system has been on the penalization of sex offenders. 1 
Recent legislative acts enhancing criminal sentences and judicial 
decisions interpreting these acts reflect the heightened concern of 
punishing sex offenders. One such example of a judicial interpretation 
is the California Supreme Court decision, People v. Hicks .2 
Hicks, as this Note will explain, has opened the door for prosecutors 
to obtain longer sentences in criminal sex offender cases. Moreover, 
Hicks is a perfect example of the California Supreme Court's unbound 
use of the canons of statutory interpretation to achieve ends that the 
California Legislature may have never intended. 
This Note will first briefly explain the applicable California statutes 
to a Hicks ' type of situation. Second, a brief history of the state of the 
law preceding Hicks will be provided. Third, the actual Hicks decision 
will be discussed. Fourth, a critical analysis of the Hicks decision will 
be conducted. Finally, the Hicks decision's future effects on the criminal 
justice system will be discussed. 
IL THE APPLICABLE STATUTES: CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS 
6543 AND 667.64 
Two Penal Code statutes are at issue here. Understanding the way 
that these statutes correlate with each other is imperative to understand-
ing the court's holding and rationale in Hicks. 
A. California Penal Code Section 654 
Section 654 of the California Penal Code, entitled "Offenses punish-
able in different ways by different provisions; double jeopardy,"5 states, 
in pertinent part, "[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in 
different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under 
more than one. "6 This statute, in its strict textual sense, prohibits 
punishing a criminal twice for the same "act or omission." The Penal 
Code provides different ways for sentencing a single act and section 654 
is designed to safeguard the risk of a prosecutor or judge attempting to 
1. For discussions on reform in this area of the law; see generally CASSIA SPOHN 
AND JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM (1992); Public Hearing on Legal Problems of 
Rape Before the California Legislature Senate Comm. on Judiciary (1987). 
2. 6 Cal. 4th 784, 863 P.2d 714, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469 (1993). 
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1994). 
4. Id. § 667.6. 
5. Id. § 654. 
6. Id. ( emphasis added). 
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invoke more than one of these methods.7 The rationale behind section 
654 is rooted in the double jeopardy clause of the United States 
Constitution. 8 
Despite section 654 's limited textual application only to "an act or 
omission," this statute has been extended, through judicial interpretation, 
to apply to much broader situations. The extension, often referred to as 
the "Neal test,"9 makes section 654 applicable to situations where more 
than one act was actually com.m.itted, but several of the acts were 
conducted in what is called "an indivisible course of conduct" or 
"indivisible transaction."10 In other words, a criminal may be convicted 
of several offenses, but he or she will only be sentenced for the crimes 
in which the criminal had a separate intent for that crime. The criminal 
will not be sentenced for crimes that were only incidental to his or her 
main objective.11 As the California Supreme Court stated in Neal: "If 
all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be 
punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one."12 
7. For example, if a defendant committed and was convicted of a single act of 
rape and a single act of sodomy, the court could impose a sentence for each crime. 
However, if the prosecution also wanted to have the defendant sentenced for a general 
le_wd and lascivious conduct conviction that was solely based on the rape and sodomy 
acts, the court would be prohibited by section 654 to impose such a sentence because 
the lewd and lascivious charge was based on the same acts as the rape and sodomy. See 
People v. Siko, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 755 P.2d 294, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1988). 
8. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, in pertinent part, "nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This portion of the Fifth Amendment has been held to 
be applicable to the individual states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). 
9. The name for this test is derived from the California Supreme Court case, Neal 
v. California. 55 Cal. 2d 11,357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960), cert. denied, 365 
U.S. 823 (1961). However, Neal was not the first case to establish the legal principle 
for which the case is famous. People v. Brown was the first case to establish the 
doctrine now referred to as the Neal test. People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d 
5 (1958). 
10. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 357 P.2d at 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 
11. In determining whether the crimes were. part of an indivisible course of 
conduct, "[i]t is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his 
offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible." People v. Harrison, 
48 Cal. 3d 321, 335, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1989). 
12. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 357 P.2d at 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The following 
illustration may help eliminate any confusion as to what constitutes "an act or omission" 
provided in section 654 and what constitutes a Neal test situation: A defendant lights 
the outside of a building on fire. There is more than one possible statutory way to 
punish the defendant for his criminal act. For example he could be punished for arson 
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B. California Penal Code Section 667. 6(c) 
Section 667.6(c) of the California Penal Code specifically addresses 
permissive (versus mandatory) sentencing when the crimes being 
punished are sex offenses. Subdivision (c), of section 667.6, gives a 
judge discretion to impose a full, separate, and consecutive term for 
particular sex offense convictions such as rape, genital penetration with 
a foreign object, and sodomy, among others.13 
Section 667 .6( c) is a discretionary alternative to the general consecu-
tive sentencing formula provided by Penal Code section 1170.1.14 
and some sort of vandalism. However, under section 654, the court would only allow 
one of the sentences to be invoked. 
Changing the facts slightly, the defendant enters the building to light the building on 
fire. He is then charged with burglary and arson. Under the Neal rule concerning 
section 654, the burglary is arguably incidental to the defendant's main objective of 
arson. Therefore, the defendant would not be sentenced for both the burglary and the 
arson. 
13. Section 667.6(c) states in pertinent part: 
In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive 
term may be imposed for each violation of Section 220, other than an assault 
with intent to commit mayhem, provided that the person has been convicted 
previously of violating Section 220 for an offense other than an assault with 
intent to commit mayhem, paragraph (2), (3), or (7) of subdivision (a) of 
Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 288.5 or 
289, of committing sodomy in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 286, of 
committing oral copulation in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 288a, or 
of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a 
by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
injury on the victim or another person whether or not the crimes were 
committed during a single transaction. 
Cal. Penal Code § 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added). 
In order to properly implement section 667 .6( c ), the sentencing judge must satisfy two 
requirements. First, the judge must identify the criteria used to justify the use of section 
667.6(c) and, second, the record must show that the court recognized that utilizing 
section 667.6(c) is a separate and additional sentencing choice. People v. Belmontes, 34 
Cal. 3d 335, 348, 667 P.2d 686, 693, 193 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1983). 
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (WEST 1994). Section 1170. l is the general 
sentencing formula when multiple sentencing is involved. Section 1170. l(a) states, in 
pertinent part: . 
Id. 
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[W]hen any person is convicted of two or more felonies . . . the aggregate 
term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of the 
principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed pursuant 
to [other statutes permitting additional terms]. The principal term shall consist 
of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the 
crimes. . . . The subordinate term for each consecutive offense . . . shall 
consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each 
other felony conviction . . . for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is 
imposed. . . . In no case shall the total of subordinate terms for these 
consecutive offenses . . . exceed five years. 
[VOL. 32: 285, 1995] People v. Hicks 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Therefore, section 1170.1 should briefly be discussed. Section 1170.1 
pertains to sentencing when two or more felony convictions are 
involved. The general formula of section 1170.1, subject to certain 
exceptions, consists of a principal term, which is the greatest term of 
imprisonment for any of the crimes, and subordinate terms, which are 
one-third of the middle term provided for each of the additional felonies. 
The subordinate terms are not to exceed five years in the aggregate. The 
sum of the imprisonment sentence can not exceed twice the principle 
term.15 
The following demonstrates the general formula. A defendant is 
convicted of three felonies that carry terms of four, six, and eight years 
respectively. Suppose the court, following section 1170.1, first imposes 
a principal term of eight years, which is the largest felony sentence. To 
this principal term the court would determine the middle term for the 
other two felonies, which would be two and three years. One-third of 
each middle term would be added to the principal term, providing a total 
sentence of nine years eight· months. It is important to note that the 
sentencing formula of section 1170.1 is subject to the limitations set 
forth by section 654.16 Thus, sentencing the same act twice is prohibit-
ed.11 
Section 667.6(c), as noted earlier, expressly provides an 
alternative to the general formula of section 1170.1. Section 667.6(c) 
allows a judge to sum the full principle terms of each sex offense 
irrespective of length of time that results from the summation. The 
rationale behind this rule is that a criminal has a separate intent for each 
sex offense committed. 18 However, the primary theme of this Note 
addresses a different question: Whether punishment of non-sex offenses 
not listed in section 667.6(c), which were merely incidental to commit-
ting the enumerated sex offenses, are still protected under the indivisible 
transaction rule of section 654. 
15. Id.§ 1170.l(g)(2). 
16. Section 1170.l(a) states: "Except as provided in subdivision (c) and subject 
to Section 654 .... " Id.§ 1170.l(a). 
17. Furthermore, when invoking section 1170.1, crimes that are part of an 
indivisible course of conduct or, in other words, incidental to the main objective of the 
defendant's act are not subject to sentencing because of the Neal rule. 
18. People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 554, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45 
(1979); People v. Harrison 48 Cal. 3d 321, 336, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 
401, 410 (1989). 
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III. STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO HICKS 
The California Supreme Court has been moving toward a general trend 
of imposing stiffer penalties for sex offenders. This most likely reflects 
societal concerns of sexual abuse and sexual crimes.19 
The trend began in the California Supreme Court case of People v. 
Perez. 20 Perez involved a defendant who committed a brutal sexual 
attack on the victim, who was also the manager of the apartment 
complex in which the defendant lived. The sexual acts included oral 
copulation, sodomy, penetration with a foreign object, and rape.21 The 
defense counsel claimed that "section 654 precluded imposition of 
sentence on the oral copulation and sodomy convictions because those 
crimes were committed pursuant to the same intent and objective as the 
rape."22 The California Supreme Court disagreed. The Perez court held 
that none of the sex offenses were committed as a means of committing 
any other, and none were incidental to the commission of any other. 
Therefore, section 654 did not prohibit multiple punishment.23 Perez 
was handed down during the time in which section 667 .6( c) was being 
discussed by the legislature, but it had not yet been codi:fied.24 Thus, 
section 667 .6, because not yet enacted, was inapplicable to Perez. 
In 1989, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Harrison25, again 
without invoking section 667 .6( c )26, imposed consecutive full-term 
sentences (versus the 1/3 term mid-term formula of 1170.1) for various 
sex offenses committed by the defendant.27 The court held that section 
19. For commentaries regarding views toward sex offenders, see generally Andrew 
Vachss, Sex Predators Can't Be Saved; They Are Incorrigible Monsters and Should Be 
Locked Up Forever, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 14, 1993, at 6; Alice Vachss, Criminal Justice 
System Must Stop Appeasing Rapists, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 8, 1993, at 6. 
20. 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979). 
21. Id. at 549, 591 P.2d at 65, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 42. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 553-54, 591 P.2d at 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 45. 
24. Perez was handed down in March, 1979, section 667.6(c) was enacted in 
September 1979. Act of Sept. 22, 1979, ch. 944, § 10, 1979 Cal. Stat. 3258. 
25. 48 Cal. 3d 321, 768 P.2d 1078, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1989). 
26. Section 667.6(c) was on the books at the time of the Harrison decision, but it 
is not clear why the court did not use this section, or at least, explain why section 
667.6(c) did not apply. The court's reasoning indicates that the court, following Perez, 
found separate intents for each sexual offense. However, in essence, this is the exact 
finding that section 667.6(c) codifies---the criminal defendant has a separate intent for 
each sexual offense and therefore consecutive full-term sentences can be imposed. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1994). 
27. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 338, 768 P.2d at 1088, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12. The 
sex crimes in Harrison consisted of three convictions of penetratioh of the genital 
opening with a foreign object under" Penal Code section 289. The defendant went into 
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654 did not prohibit imposing the consecutive full-term sentences.28 
The Harrison court stated: "Since 'none of the sex offenses was 
committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated 
commission of any other, and none was incidental' to any other, section 
654 did not apply."29 The court's holding was based on the finding 
that, even though the defendant's actions were conducted during a 
continuous attack, the defendant "harbored 'multiple criminal objec-
tives' ."30 The Harrison court, following Perez, rejected the defendant's 
argument that he had a single intent and objective of obtaining sexual 
gratification.31 
The California Supreme Court, addressing and interpreting section 
667.6(c), decided People v. Jones. 32 The defendant in Jones forcefully · 
entered the victim's house with two other defendants, tied and ~agged 
the victim's husband, and then raped and sodomized the victim. 3 The 
defendants then ransacked the house and took various household items. 
As a result of a plea bargain, the defendant Jones pleaded guilty to one 
count of rape and robbery. 34 
In Jones, the California Supreme Court made two significant findings 
in regard to section 667.6(c). First, the court held that "a single 
conviction of an enumerated sex offense is sufficient to trigger" the use 
of section 667.6(c).35 Second, and as the means of reaching the first 
holding, the court held that the words "the crimes" in the phrase 
"whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transac-
tion"36 were not limited to the enumerated sex offenses listed in 
the victim's home and, over a span of about ten minutes and while fighting strong 
resistance from the victim, inserted his fingers into the victim's vagina three different 
times. Id. at 325, 768 P.2d at 1079, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
28. Id. at 338, 768 P.2d at 1088, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12. 
29. Id. at 336, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (quoting People v. Perez, 
23 Cal. 3d 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45). It is important to note 
that even though the Harrison court found that section 654 did not preclude consecutive 
sentences for the sex offenses, the trial court stayed the execution of a six year burglary 
sentence pursuant to section 654. Id. at 326, 768 P.2d at 1080, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
30. Id. at 335, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 409. 
31. Id. 
32. 46 Cal. 3d 585, 758 P.2d 1165, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). 
33. Id. at 590, 758 P.2d at 1167, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 589, 758 P.2d at 1166, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636. For further discussion of 
the Jones court's decision, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
36. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added). 
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subdivision( c ). "The crimes," the court found, extended to any crime 
sufficient to trigger section 1170.1, the general sentencing statute.37 
The Jones court's holding resulted in the triggering of punishment under 
section 667.6(c) when only one sexual offense was committed with 
another non-sex felony.38 However, the defendant in Jones had a 
separate intent for each crime he committed, making section 654 
inapplicable.39 Because the defendant had separate intents for each 
37. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d at 593-94, 758 P.2d at 1169-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The 
Jones court stated: 
Id. 
Finally and most importantly, the assumption that the words "the crimes" in 
subdivision (c) refer only to the ESO's is incorrect. Subdivision (c) starts with 
the phrase "In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1" and in order to 
bring section 1170.1 into play at all, the defendant must have been convicted 
of multiple crimes. In our view, it is to these multiple crimes that the 
language "the crimes" in the final clause of subdivision (c) must refer. 
38. Id. at 600, 758 P.2d at 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The court stated: "We 
conclude that where a defendant stands convicted of multiple felonies, subdivision (c) 
vests the sentencing court with discretionary authority to impose a full, consecutive term 
for any ESO conviction, even when the defendant stands convicted of only one ESO." 
Id. 
Justice Mosk, dissenting in Jones, makes a compelling argument by showing that the 
Legislative intent behind section 667.6(c) was that the statute should only take effect 
when more than one enumerated sex offense is involved. He points out that every other 
section of the statute only takes effect when multiple enumerated sex offenses are 
involved. Id. at 604; 758 P.2d at 1176-77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47. He stated: "In 
determining [Legislative] intent, we must view each part of a statute in the context of 
the whole statute and its purpose." Id. (citing People v. Black, 32 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 648 P.2d 
104, 106, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 456 (1982)). Justice Mosk concluded that because the 
other sections only applied to multiple sex offense situations and because no exception 
to this was stated in subdivision ( c ), subdivision ( c) is only triggered when more than 
one enumerated sex offense is committed. Id. at 604-05, 758 P.2d at 1177, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. at 64 7. .· . 
This author strongly disagrees with the Jones court's interpretation of section 
667 .6( c )---especially that the words "the crimes" extend beyond enumerated sex offenses. 
Disagreement w~th "the crimes" holding leads to the author's disagreement with the 
holding that only one sex offense is needed to trigger section 667 .6( c ), that is, the Jones 
court reliance on its "crimes" interpretation to reach this holding. 
Because this Note is purported to be an analysis of the Hicks decision, I am reluctant 
to enter into an in-depth analysis of the Jones decision for fear of losing focus of the 
paper for the reader. However, Jones does need to be discussed to some extent because 
it is directly related and interwoven with the theme of the Hicks decision. Moreover, 
it further exemplifies the California Supreme Court's disingenuous attitude toward this 
issue and its abuse of the statutory interpretation rules. A further discussion of Jones can 
be found in Part V(A). 
39. In Jones, the defendant first committed the violent sex crimes and then 
subsequently stole items from the victims house. Jones, 46 Cal: 3d at 589-90, 758 P.2d 
at 1166, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The defendant did not commit the sex crimes to 
facilitate his robbery. 
The Jones court, later in its opinion, infers that their holding applied to separate intent 
crimes by providing a hypothetical jn which their holding would be applicable: 
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crime, the court never had to address the issue as to what the section 
667.6(c) language "whether or not the crimes were committed during a 
single transaction" meant-the precise issue in Hicks. 
In summation, in Perez, Harrison, and Jones the defendants had 
separate intents for their crimes, making section 654 inapplicable. The 
differences between the way the cases were decided is most likely a 
result of the how the prosecution decided to argue the case and how the 
defense counsel defended the case. 
The California Courts of Appeal have been in conflict as to whether 
section 654 is applicable to the sentencing scheme under section 667 .6( c) 
when both sex and non-sex offenses are involved.40 The California 
Supreme Court decided to review the Hicks appellate court decision to 
resolve this conflict. 
IV. THE HICKS DECISION 
The defendant, Eric Tomont Hicks, entered a bakery at approximately 
three a.m. where the victim was working alone. The door was closed 
but unlocked. Hicks, after determining the victim was alone, grabbed 
her and pushed her into the bathroom. He raped her six times, 
committed two acts of sodomy, and on two separate occasions inserted 
his fingers into her vagina. Hicks then ordered her to clean both of 
A burglar breaks into a residence, assuming it to be unoccupied and -intending 
only to steal some items inside, when he comes upon a woman who is 
unarmed and alone. The burglar recognizes an opportunity to take advantage 
of the circumstances and commits a 'convenient,' additional offense involving 
a separately formed criminal intent-forcible rape, sodomy or oral copula-
tion. 
Id. at 598, 758 P.2d at 1173, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (emphasis added). The court never 
addressed the issue of whether section 654 should apply. 
Even though the Jones holding was limited to crimes where the defendant had a 
separate intent to commit each crime, the Jones case, as the discussion of Hicks in Part 
V points out, makes for an easy extension to create an exception to section 654 for all 
of the crimes in a sex offense situation, regardless of whether they are sex offenses listed 
in section 667.6(c). 
40. Compare People v. Masten, 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515, 
522 (1982) (consecutive sentences for kidnapping and rape violated the proscription 
against multiple punishment under section 654), disapproved on other grounds, People 
v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 643 (1988) with 
People v. Andrus, 226 Cal. App. 3d 73, 78-79, 276 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1990) (defendant 
could be consecutively sentenced for sex crimes and kidnapping even though kidnapping 
was committed for purpose of committing the sex crimes). 
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them, and they then dressed. He then told her he would help her 
complete her duties. The victim resumed working until two men entered 
the bakery to deliver newspapers. At this time the victim asked Hicks 
to leave and he did as she asked. She locked the door and called her 
supervisor to report that she had been raped.41 
Hicks was convicted of two counts of forcible sodomy42, six counts 
of rape43, two counts of genital penetration by a foreign object44, and 
one count of burglary.45 The total sentence amounted to 83 years---3 
years of which were for the burglary conviction.46 
The sole issue that was addressed by the California Supreme Court 
was "whether imposition of sentence on the burglary count constitutes 
an impermissible multiple punishment" under section 654.47 More 
specifically, the court had to decide whether section 667.6(c) created an 
implicit exception to the "indivisible" or "single" transaction doctrine 
judicially engrafted by the court when interpreting section 654.48 
41. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 788, 863 P.2d 714, 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 
471. 
Hicks is factually different from Jones (see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text) 
in that the defendant's sole purpose for entering the bakery, which resulted in a burglary, 
was to commit forced sexual acts on the defendant. Entering the bakery is arguably part 
of an indivisible course of conduct--the conduct being sexual assault. In Jones, the 
defendant raped the victim and then went and ransacked and robbed the house where the 
rape occurred. The defendant did not commit rape to achieve the purpose of committing 
robbery or vice-versa. 
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) (West 1993). 
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1986). At the time of Hick's rape 
conviction, section 261(2) defined rape as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished 
with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances 
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or fear 
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." Id. The statute has 
been since amended and the relevant provision is now section 262(a)(l). The amended 
section includes in the rape definition acts of intercourse accomplished by duress or 
menace. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26l(A)(l) (West Supp. 1995). 
44. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 289(a) (West 1993). 
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (WEST 1993). The specific charge was "burglary 
with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, or penetration by a foreign object." People v. 
Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th 88, 100, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 173 (1992) (subsequently 
depublished). 
46. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
47. Id. at 788, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. Hicks did not appeal the 
sentences for his sex offense convictions. He only was appealing the burglary sentence. 
Hicks probably did not appeal the sex offenses because, as the Hicks court noted, the 
California Supreme Court had previously held that section 654 "does not prohibit the 
imposition of multiple punishment for separate sexual offenses committed during a 
continuous attack." Id. at n.4 (citing People v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 336, 768 P. 2d 
1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 410 (1989)). 
48. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. 
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The procedural posture of the case should be noted. After the trial 
court convicted and sentenced Hicks on all counts, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the burglary sentence.49 On appeal, Hicks argued that the 
three year burglary term violated section 654 "because the burglary was 
incidental to the forcible sexual offenses for which he also was 
punished."50 The appellate court, following California precedent,51 
concluded that the burglary count violated section 654's prohibition 
against multiple punishment.52 The California Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the Court of Appeal and in an opinion by Justice George, 
concluded that section 667 .6 "created an exception to section 654 so as 
to permit the imposition of consecutive full-term sentences for enumerat-
ed offenses constituting separate acts committed during an 'indivisible' 
or 'single' transaction."53 
A. The Majority Opinion54 
Justice George began his discussion with an explanation of the scope 
of section 654. He explained that the literal meaning of section 654 
only prohibits multiple punishment arising out of the same act or 
omission. 55 He then acknowledged that the section has been extended 
to cases involving several offenses "committed during a 'course of 
conduct deemed to be indivisible in time. "'56 In determining whether 
a course of conduct is indivisible, Justice George, quoting a previous 
California Supreme Court decision, stated: 
It is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, 
which determine whether the transaction is indivisible .... If all of the offenses 
49. Id. at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
50. Id. at 788, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. See supra notes 9-12 and 
accompanying text for further discussion on the incidental objective/indivisible course 
of conduct principle. 
51. The Court of Appeal followed the California Appellate decision in People v. 
Masten, 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522 (1982), disapproved on 
other grounds, People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 635, 643 (1988). 
52. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
53. Id. at 786, 863 P.2d at 715, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. 
54. The Hicks majority consisted of Justice George writing the opinion, Chief 
Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter. Id. at 797, 863 P.2d 
at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. 
55. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
56. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. 
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were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating 
one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and 
therefore may be punished only once. 57 
Applying the interpretation of section 654, Justice George conceded that 
Hicks "entered the bakery with the single criminal objective of sexually 
assaulting the victim. "58 Therefore, as Justice George found, if section 
654 was applicable, Hick's could not be punished for both the burglary 
and the sexual offense convictions.59 
Justice George framed the issue for the court: "We must determine, 
therefore, whether section 654 prohibits such multiple punishment when 
a trial court imposes consecutive full-term sentences for the enumerated 
sexual offenses under the authority of section 667 .6, subdivision 
( c) ... _,,60 
Justice George, after explaining why a previous California Supreme 
Court case did not address this issue,61 next proceeded with an interpre-
tation of section 667 .6( c) to determine whether the legislature intended 
to create an exception to section 654, which would result in allowing the 
imposition of the burglary sentence. 
The statutory analysis began with the literal meaning of the words 
used in section 667.6(c). Because section 667.6(c) does not expressly 
refer to section 654, Justice George found it necessary to determine 
whether the statute's phrase "whether or not the crimes were committed 
during a single transaction',62 referred to section 654's ban on multiple 
punishment for acts committed during an indivisible course of con-
57. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (citing and quoting People 
v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 335, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1989)). 
58. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 789, 863 P.Zd at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. In this portion of his opinion, Justice George discussed the decision of People 
v. Sileo, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 755 P.2d 294, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1988). Referring to Siko, 
Justice George stated that the court in that case concluded, 
[w]hatever the Legislature's intent may have been with respect to the "single" 
or "indivisible transaction" rule, it is clear to us it did not intend by its 
enactment of [section 667.6(c)] to repeal or amend the prohibition of double 
punishment for multiple violations of the Penal Code based on the "same act 
or omission." 
Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 791, 863 P.2d at 718, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (quoting People v. 
Siko, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 826, 755 P.2d 294, 297, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110, 113-14. Justice 
George concluded that the issue in Hicks was expressly left unresolved in Siko. Id. The 
court did not address this question in Siko because, in Siko, the prosecution "[did] not 
seek to punish three acts once each; they [sought] to punish the same two acts twice" 
and this violates section 654. Id. at 791, 863 P.2d at 718, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 
( alteration in original). 
62. Id. 
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duct.63 If the phrase did refer to section 654's prohibition, Justice 
George found it necessary to determine "whether the use of this phrase 
expresses a legislative intent to create an exception to section 654."64 
Justice George concluded that "the only reasonable interpretation of 
section 667.6(c)" is that it creates an exception to section 654's 
prohibition of multiple punishments.65 
In reaching his conclusion, Justice George made two principal 
arguments. First, in a brief excerpt, he compared the language of section 
667 .6 to that of section 1170.1.66 He stated that section 1170.1 is 
expressly subject to section 654 whereas section 667 .6( c) is not 
expressly limited by section 654.67 Justice George found the lack of 
reference to section 654 a significant difference that implied that the 
legislature intended section 667 .6 to create an exception to section 
654.68 
Second, Justice George analyzed legislative history of section 667 .6 
to argue that the legislature intended to create an exception to section 
654. He first noted that the original version of section 667 .6( c) in the 
Senate Bill,69 in regard to mandating consecutive full-term sentences, 
included the phrase, "whether or not the crimes were committed with a 
single intent or objective or during a single transaction."70 He then 
pointed out that the Senate Committee on Judiciary concluded that the 
language, as initially proposed, "would mandate, in apparent disregard 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. Later in his opinion, 
Justice George addresses the legal principle that holds if two reasonable interpretations 
can be drawn from a criminal statute, the interpretation that is most favorable to the 
defendant should prevail. Seemingly, he was trying to rebut this argument before even 
addressing it by invoking his "only reasonable interpretation" language. 
66. Id. For further discussion of section 1170.1, see supra notes 14-16 and 
accompanying text. 
67. Id. Section 1170.1 includes the express limitation, "subject to Section 654." 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.l(a) (West 1994). In contrast, section 667.6(c) contains no 
such language. 
68. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. However, 
a directly opposite conclusion than that of Justice George could be implied. See infra 
notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
69. S. 13, 1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess. § 10 (1979). 
70. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 792-93, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis 
added). 
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of Section 654, multiple punishment for sexual offenses."71 After 
explaining that the final version of section 667 .6( c) eliminated the 
"single intent or objective" language, Justice George argued that if the 
legislature wanted section 654 to remain applicable in section 667.6(c)'s 
context, the legislature would have also deleted the language in 667 .6( c) 
that refers to crimes that "were committed during a single transac-
tion. "72 Justice George concluded that the only reasonable explanation 
for not eliminating the "single transaction" language was that "the 
Legislature intended to create an exception to section 654 that would 
allow multiple punishment for separate criminal acts committed during 
an indivisible course of conduct."73 
Much of the remainder of the majority opinion consisted of arguments 
rebutting the defendant's,74 dissent's,75 and appellate court's argu-
ments. After briefly addressing and disposing of the defendant's 
argument,76 Justice George addressed Justice Mosk's dissenting 
argument. The main premise of Justice Mosk's dissent, as Justice 
George viewed it, was that the language used in section 667 .6( c) was 
71. Id. at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis in original) 
(citing and quoting SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF s. 13, 1979-80 Cal. 
Reg. Sess. at 8 (as amended Mar. 5, 1979)). 
72. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 720, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. Justice 
George stated: 
Id. 
Had the Legislature wished to ensure that the provisions of section 654 would 
remain applicable so as to bar multiple punishment for separate criminal acts 
committed during an indivisible course of conduct, it presumably would have 
deleted not only the reference to offenses committed "with a single intent or 
objective," but also the remainder of the phrase that refers to crimes 
"committed during a single transaction." 
73. Id. Again, Justice George refers to his interpretation as the only reasonable 
interpretation. This is probably an attempt 'to counter the argument as discussed supra 
note 65. 
74. The defendant's argument, which the majority discarded rather quickly, was 
that the legislature retained the language, "whether or not the crimes were committed 
during a single transaction" in section 667.6(c) to clarify that they were rejecting an 
approach in the original version of the bill. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 720, 
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. The approach in the original version mandated consecutive full-
term sentences for each violation of Penal Code section 288, lewd conduct with a child, 
"unless such violation is committed upon one victim at the same proximate time and 
place as part of and in immediate conjunction with any other violation of [section 288] 
upon such victim for which the term is imposed." Id. (alteration in original) (citing and 
quoting S. 13, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. § 7, as introduced Dec. 4, 1978). The majority 
rejected the defendant's argument by stating: "Defendant does not explain why the 
Legislature would need 'to clarify' that it had rejected a particular approach, when the 
specific language that would have enacted such an approach previously had been deleted 
from the bill." Id. 
75. Justice Mosk was the only dissenting judge in the Hicks opinion. Id. at 784, 
863 P.2d at 715, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. 
76. See supra note 74. 
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used to distinguish that subsection from another subsection of the statute, 
section 667.6(d).77 The majority found that following the dissent's 
interpretation, the language in question, "whether or not the crimes were 
committed during a single transaction", would be mere surplusage. 
Justice George concluded: "Such statutory construction is to be 
avoided."78 
Justice George next addressed the Court of Appeal's argument, which 
Justice George apparently found most persuasive of the three argu-
ments.79 The Court of Appeal's argument was based on the enactment 
of another Penal Code section--section 667.8.80 Section 667.8 imposes 
an additional term of punishment if the defendant kidnapped his or her 
victim for the purpose of committing the sexual offense.81 The Court 
of Appeal observed that section 667 .8 was enacted after the appellate 
court decision in People v. Masten,82 which held that consecutive 
sentences could not be imposed for kidnapping and rape convictions 
when the offenses were part of an indivisible course of conduct.83 The 
Court of Appeal deemed it significant that the legislature enacted a new 
section to cover the kidnapping/rape situation rather than merely 
amending section 667.6(c) to "make clear that full, separate and 
consecutive terms could be imposed" under section 667.6(c).84 
Justice George disagreed with the Court of Appeal's arguments and 
conclusion for two reasons. First, he believed that the legislature, by 
77. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 794, 863 P.2d at ?20, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. The main 
difference between the two subdivisions is that subdivision ( c) is discretionary whereas 
subdivision (d) requires full-term consecutive sentencing "if the crimes involve separate 
victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions." Id. For further discussion 
of Justice Mosk's argument, see infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text. 
78. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 794, 863 P.2d at 720, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. 
79. Justice George stated: "We acknowledge that a rational argument can be made 
for the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in the present case .... " Id. at 795, 
863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. 
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8 (West 1993). 
81. Section 667.8(a) states, "Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person 
convicted of a felony violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288a, or 289 who, for the 
purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 
207, shall be punished by an additional term of three years." Id. 
82. 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1982) disapproved on other 
grounds, People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 
643 (1988). 
83. Id. at 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
84. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 794, 863 P.2d 714, 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 
476 (1993). 
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enacting Penal Code section 667 .8, a mandatory sentencing statute, 
achieved a different result than if it were to amend section 667.6(c), a 
discretionary sentencing statute. Because the new section contained 
mandatory sentencing rather than discretionary sentencing, Justice 
George argued, the legislature could not have achieved its goal by only 
amending section 667.6(c).85 Second, Justice George noted that section 
667.8 applies to some sex offenses not covered by section 667.6(c). 
Based on these two observations, he concluded that the enactment of 
section 667.8 does not support the argument that section 654 prohibits 
"the imposition of consecutive full-term sentences under section 667 .6( c) 
for separate offenses committed during an indivisible transaction."86 
In concluding his analysis of the appellate court's rationale, Justice 
George conceded that in a case where two reasonable interpretations of 
a statute could be determined, the interpretation most favorable to the 
defendant should be invoked.87 However, he found that section 
667 .6( c) had only one reasonable interpretation. He stated that 
interpreting section 667.6(c) as subject to section 654 "would leave 
entirely without meaning the language in section 667.6(c) allowing 
consecutive sentences 'whether or not the crimes were committed during 
a single transaction. "'88 
Justice George concluded his opinion with a culpability argument to 
justify that the majority's "interpretation of section 667.6(c) produces a 
just result in the present case."89 Justice George explained that the 
statute was implemented so as to allow sentencing enhancement for 
sexual offenders who committed multiple offenses. He stated that the 
85. Id. at 795, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. Justice George stated: 
"Thus, the additional tenn mandated by section 667.8 must be imposed even if the trial 
court declines to impose consecutive sentences or elects instead to impose standard 
consecutive sentences under section 1170.1 rather than the consecutive full-term 
sentences authorized under section 667.6(c)." Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 795-96, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. 
88. Id. at 796, 863 P.2d. at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. Justice George, in 
arguing that the language of section 667.6(c) would be without meaning, stated the 
general rule that "a statute should not be given a construction that results in rendering 
one of its provisions nugatory." Id. (citing and quoting People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554, 
560, 715 P.2d 585, 588, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1984)). 
Justice George also argued that a contrary interpretation would contradict the 
California Supreme Court's holding in Jones. People v. Jones, 46 Cal.3d 585, 758 P.2d 
1165, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). See supra note 51. Justice George noted that the 
appellate court's interpretation would limit multiple punishment to the sex offenses 
enumerated in section 667.6(c). He concluded that this interpretation is directly contrary 
to the Jones holding that the phrase "the crimes" in section 667.6(c) includes both sex 
and non-sex offenses. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477 
n.9. 
89. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 477. 
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statute's increased penalties were based on the rationale that "a 
defendant who commits 'a number of base criminal acts on his victim 
is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one 
such act. "'_90 Applying this principle to the present case, Justice George 
argued that Hick's burglary, the act of entering the bakery, "aggravated 
the crime by increasing the victim's vulnerability and decreasing her 
chance of escape."91 Therefore, as the argument concluded, increased 
punishment for the burglary was appropriate. 
B. The Dissent 
Justice Mosk, the lone dissenter, began his opinion by flatly rejecting 
the majority's opinion and stating: "In my view, Penal Code section 654 
bars imposition of a full, consecutive term of imprisonment for 
defendant's burglary conviction."92 Mosk first criticized the majority's 
use of the canons of statutory construction.93 He was appalled by the 
prosecution's eagerness and the court's willingness to impose an 
additional sentence for the burglary conviction, when the sentence would 
never be served as a result of Hick's age.94 · 
90. Id. (citing and quoting People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 553, 591 P.2d 63, 68, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 44 (1979); People v. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 1211, 858 P. 2d 611, 
616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144, 149 (1993)). Ironically, even though the court cited Latimer 
for holding the proposition that a defendant who commits multiple acts on his victim is 
more culpable, the California Supreme Court in Latimer did not allow punishment of a 
kidnapping offense that was only to facilitate the defendant's rape of his victim in that 
case. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. For further 
discussion of the Latimer decision, see infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text. 
91. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796-97, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. 
92. Id. at 797, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. 
93. Id. Justice Mosk stated: "The majority reach a contrary conclusion because 
they fail to apply standard canons of statutory construction. The result is the addition 
of three years to an absurd sentence of eighty years in prison." Id. 
· 94. Id. Justice Mosk stated: "A sentence like the one imposed here, that cannot 
possibly be completed in the defendant's lifetime, makes a mockery of the law and 
amounts to cruel or unusual punishment." Id. He continued: 
[T]here is something unseemly in the eagerness of the People to argue that an 
ambiguous expression of the Legislature be interpreted to provide for the 
absolute maximum punishment, when defendant already stands sentenced to 
a term he will never live long enough to complete. Furthermore, I fail to 
understand the willingness of the majority of this court to twist the canons of 
statutory construction to assure that defendant's ghost serves an additional 
three years in confinement. . . . There is a point at which enough is enough. 
Id. at 797-98, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. Justice Mosk makes a very 
viable point in the commentary above. Arguably, the court viewed this case as a perfect 
301 
Justice Mosk then turned to the meaning of the statute itself. He 
reasoned that to infer that the language of section 667.6(c) created an 
exception to section 654 would make the term "single transaction" mere 
surplusage which should be avoided in interpreting statutes.95 He based 
this conclusion on the fact that case law preceding the enactment of 
section 667 .6 had held that punishment of multiple sex offenses such as 
those listed in section 667.6 had not been subject to the limitations of 
section 654.96 He explained that the reasoning behind the holdings was 
that the "defendant is considered to have multiple criminal objectives 
when he commits multiple sex offenses during a single attack. "97 In 
other words, Justice Mosk was implying that section 667.6(c) codified 
the principle that each sex offense committed contains a separate intent, 
therefore rendering section 654 inapplicable to the sentencing of these 
sex offenses-not that an exception to section 654 was being created. 
Justice Mosk then provided his view as to what the term "single 
transaction" means. Referring to legislative history, he interpreted the 
language in issue as a description of the type of punishments for sex 
offenses which are permissible, or discretionary, as compared to those 
which are mandatory under section 667.6(d).98 He explained that the 
original provisions of section 667 .6( c) "required mandatory full 
opportunity to continue its extension in the area of increased punishment for sex 
offenders. The court, probably realizing that this case would be viewed as somewhat 
irrelevant and unemotional because of an insignificant three year sentence in issue, knew 
they could rationalize their holding with little resistance from the legislature. However, 
the Hicks decision will create anomalous applications in the future. See infra notes 150-
51 and accompanying text. 
95. Id. at 798, 863 P.2d at 723, 255 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. 
96. Id. (citing People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d at 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 40, 45 (1979); People v. Hicks, 63 Cal. 2d 764, 766, 408 P.2d 747, 749, 48 
Cal. Rptr. 139, 141 (1965); People v. Harrison 48 Cal. 3d 321, 335-38, 768 P.2d 1078, 
1086-88, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409-11 (1989)). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 799, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. Section 667.6(d), in 
pertinent part, states: 
A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of 
Section 220, other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem, provided 
that the person has been convicted previously of violating Section 220 for an 
offense other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem, paragraph (2), 
(3), or (7) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of 
Section 288, Section 289, of committing sodomy in violation of subdivision 
(k) of Section 286, of committing oral copulation in violation of subdivision 
(k) of section 288(a), or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation 
of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person if the 
crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate 
occasions. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1994) (emphasis added). 
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consecutive sentences, providing for discretion in sentencing only when 
the offenses were part of a single attack."99 He then pointed out that 
the original version of the statute was amended to provide that consecu-
tive full-term sentencing was mandatory with no exceptions. 100 He 
noted that this was the point in the statute's creation at which the 
majority began its analysis. 101 Noting that the legislature was in 
conflict as to whether the consecutive sentences should be mandatory or 
discretionary, the following compromise ensued: "[T]he phrase 'single 
intent and objective' was deleted ... , subdivision (c) ... was amended 
to be permissive, and subdivision ( d) was added to specify under what 
conditions full consecutive sentences would be mandatory."102 Justice 
Mosk, viewed the changes in the statute during its adoption process to 
depict the "Legislature's struggle to define when the sentencing court 
retains discretion whether to impose full, consecutive sentences, but not 
any intent to confront the separate and largely irrelevant problem of 
section 654."103 
Justice Mosk concluded his opinion by arguing that at the bare 
minimum, section 667.6 is ambiguous on whether section 654 applies. 
He noted the conflicts in the lower courts as to the interpretation of 
section 667.6(c).104 These conflicts, he argued, did not lead to the 
majority's conclusion that the only reasonable interpretation of section 
667 .6( c) is that it creates an exception to section 654. He reiterated that 
the legislature, when enacting the statute, had no need to be concerned 
with section 654 's prohibitions in regard to forcible sex offenses. 105 
In concluding that there is more thaq. one reasonable interpretation to 
section 667.6(c), Justice Mosk stated: "Accordingly, we should adhere 
99. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 799, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (emphasis 





103. Id. at 799-800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. 
104. Id. at 800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (citing People v. Andrus, 
226 Cal. App. 3d 73, 78-79, 276 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32-33 (1990); People v. Anderson, 221 
Cal. App. 3d 331, 339-43, 270 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521-24 (1990); People v. Masten 137 Cal. 
App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522-23 (1982)). 
105. Id. 
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to the basic principle of construction that ambiguity in a penal statute 
should be interpreted in favor of the defendant."106 
V. ANALYSIS OF HICKS 
Through the use of Eric Tomont Hicks and some very questionable, 
disingenuous statutory interpretation, the California Supreme Court has 
nearly completed its quest to eliminate the protection of section 654 with 
respect to multiple sex offense cases. 
A. The Jones-Hicks Dilemma 
As previously discussed, the California Supreme Court in Jones 
interpreted the words "the crimes" to apply to more than just those 
enumerated sex offenses expressly stated in section 667 .6( c ). 107 This 
interpretation would appear to reach the exact same result that the 
California Supreme Court was eager to reach in Hicks~onsecutive full-
term sentences may be uninhibitedly imposed under section 667.6(c) if 
at least one of the crimes is a sexual offense listed in section 667 .6( c ). 
After all, the Jones court basically stated that a consecutive full-term 
sentence could be imposed for each enumerated sex offense conviction 
along with a full-term non-sex offense sentence. This gives the same 
result as Hicks, with the only difference being that Hicks involved more 
full-term sex offense sentences that could be added to the full term non-
sex offense sentence. Therefore, if both cases have essentially the same 
holding, why was the Hicks decision necessary? 
The answer to this question must be that the Jones court did not even 
contemplate a Hicks type situation, a situation involving a conflict with 
section 654, when interpret1ng section 667.6(c). Arguably, the Jones 
court's holding could be read such 'that consecutive full-term sentences 
can be imposed for multiple offenses, even if only one conviction is a 
section 667.6(c) sex offense, only if the non-sex offenses involved a 
separate intent and objective. 108 This interpretation of the Jones 
106. Id. at 800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (citing People v. Davis, 
29 Cal. 3d 814,828,633 P.2d 186, 193, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521,529 (1981)). 
107. People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 593-94, 758 P.2d 1165, 1169-70, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 635, 639. The Jones majority stated: "[W]e believe the words 'the crimes' in 
subdivision ( c) were meant to refer to the multiple sex or nonsex felonies otherwise 
required to bring section 1170.1 into play, not just multiple ESO's." Id. at 597, 758 P.2d 
at 1171, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 641 ( emphasis added). For a discussion of Jones, see supra 
notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
108. As previously mentioned, the defendant in Jones did have a separate intent for 
both the robbery and the rape offenses for which he was sentenced. See supra note 39 
and accompanying text. 
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holding is supported by language in the opinion. The Jones court stated: 
"[T]he court may discretionarily impose a full, consecutive sentence for 
each ESQ conviction, irrespective of whether the violent sex crime and 
the other crime making section 1170.1 fotentially applicable were 
committed 'during a single transaction. "'10 Section 1170.1 is express-
ly limited by section 654. Therefore, in order for multiple crimes to 
make section 1170.1 "potentially applicable," a separate intent and 
objective would be needed for each crime. This reasoning indicates that 
the Jones court based its holding on the assumption that the language of 
section 667.6(c), "whether or not the crimes were committed during a 
single transaction" meant something other than the Hicks indivisible 
transaction interpretation. However, the Jones court never provided a 
meaning for "indivisible transaction." 
Arguably, the Jones court did not even contemplate a situation where 
the non-sex offense was merely incidental to the sex offense.110 The 
court never mentioned section 654 or what might result if section 654 
would apply. Also, the hypothetical fact scenario given by the court to 
support its position involved crimes with separate intents. m 
B. The Hicks Opinion Analysis 
As noted in Part IV the Hicks court primarily uses two means in 
reaching its purpose: 1) a textual interpretation incorporating legislative 
history and, 2) a culpability argument. These two means will be 
discussed below. Also, an analysis of the Hicks opinion in light of 
conflicting precedent and other penal code legislation not addressed in 
the opinion itself will be presented. 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
The statutory interpretation of section 667 .6( c) conducted by the Hicks 
majority primarily took the form of two arguments. First, the majority 
109. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d at 594, 758 P.2d at 1170, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (emphasis 
added). 
110. Arguably, the court's finding that "the crimes" extended beyond those listed 
in section 667.6(c) is mere dicta. It was not the essential holding of the case. If the 
Jones court did contemplate a Hicks type of situation, they may have not discussed the 
issue because it could possibly interfere with the court's desired holding by having to 
refute the limitations of section 654. 
111. See supra note 39. 
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compared the language of section 667 .6( c) to that of section 1170.1, the 
statute expressly limited by section 654. The majority found it important 
that section 1170.1 contained the language, "subject to section 654" 
whereas section 667 .6( c) contained no such language.112 This 
argument, though persuasive, is tenuous-----especially in light of the fact 
that section 667.6(c) does refer to section 1170.1 and section 1170.1 
refers to section 654. Section 667.6(c) specifically references the 
sentencing formula provided in section 1170.1 by stating: "In lieu of the 
term provided in Section 1170.1 .... "113 This alternative formula in 
section 667.6(c) is still subject to the same iimitations of the formula of 
section 1170.1, namely section 654. Section 667.6(c) is only replacing 
the method of summing the terms for the crimes rather than replacing 
the theme of the sentencing statute--sentences subject to multiple 
punishment. 
Furthermore, section 1170.1 specifically references section 667 .6. 
Section 1170.1, regarding 667 .6, states, in pertinent part, "subject to 
Section 654, when any person is convicted of two or more felonies . . . 
the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the 
sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term 
imposed pursuant to Section ... 667.6 .... "114 This language of 
section 1170.1 arguably implicates a legislative intent to make 667 .6( c) 
susceptible to section 654. 
Second, the majority looked to the legislative history to determine if 
section 667.6(c) created an exception to section 654. The Hicks majority 
stated: "The Legislature's reason for deleting from section 667.6(c) the 
[languange 'single intent or objective' from] the phrase 'whether or not 
the crimes were committed with a single intent or objective or during a 
single transaction' is not apparent."115 
However, the reason may be more apparent than the Hicks majority 
would like to admit. The California Supreme Court in Neal initially 
framed the section 654 extended interpretation issue as follows: 
"Whether a course of criminal c<;mduct is divisible and therefore gives 
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on 
the intent and objective of the actor."116 Arguably, when the legisla-
ture, in its original provisions of section 667.6(c), used the "intent or 
112. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 792, 863 P.2d 714, 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 
474 (1993). 
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added). 
114. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.l(a) (West 1993). 
115. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis 
added). . 
116. Neal v. California, 55 Cal. 2d l l, 19, 357 P.2d 839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 61 l 
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 823 (1961). 
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objective" language, it was precisely referring to the "indivisible course 
of conduct" test set forth in Neal and intended to create an exception to 
this rule. The legislature, in subsequent statutory revisions, could very 
well have been purposely not creating an exception to section 654 by 
removing the "intent or objective" language from the statute. The 
legislature most likely removed the phrase "single intent or objective" 
because it realized the phrase was useless language because the courts 
had already held that in cases involving multiple sex crimes, all of the 
sex crimes have separate intents. 117 Therefore, if the language re-
mained in the statute, it would be suggesting that some multiple sex 
crime situations could involve only one intent and that these situations 
would be exempt from a section 654 prohibition. 
Thus, the phrase "or during a single transaction" arguably was serving 
a different purpose than that of referencing section 654. By deleting the 
"intent or objective" language and retaining the "single transaction" 
language, the legislature effectuated its purpose: consecutive full-term 
sentences could be imposed for the sexual offenses listed in section 
667.6(c) regardless of whether they were committed during only one 
uninterrupted transaction with the victim, because each offense has a 
separate intent-not because they should be excepted from section 654 
in spite of a single intent or objective. 
An Assembly Committee report contemporaneous to the enactment of 
section 667.6(c) also supports the conclusion that non-sex offenses were 
not intended to be included in the scope of section 667.7(c).118 The 
Assembly Committee report stated: "SB 13 provides that a full separate 
term shall be served for each conviction of rape, rape in concert, 
sodomy, oral copulation, object rape and child molestation."119 This 
report specifically refers to the sex offenses that were listed in the 
statute. Obviously, the legislature was interested in allowing sex offense 
117. As previously discussed, in Perez, the California Supreme Court, held that 
separate intents were involved. For discussion of the Perez decision, see supra notes 20-
24 and accompanying text. 
118. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS of S. 13 (1979). 
119. Id. The Hicks majority did not refer to this report, but instead referenced a 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary report. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS 
OF S. 13, 1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess., at 8 (as amended Mar. 5, 1979). This report 
summarized section 667.6(c) in the same manner as the Assembly Report: "This bill 
would ... provide that a 'full, separate and consecutive term' would be served for each 
conviction of such an offense." Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 121-24 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of the Senate Committee on Judiciary Report. 
307 
convictions to carry consecutive full-term sentences. The report does not 
mention anything regarding imposing full consecutive sentences for non-
sex offenses not covered by the statute. Therefore, the intent of the 
legislature regarding section 667.6(c) is more clearly depicted as a desire 
to exclusively make sex offenses carry full-term consecutive sentences. 
The legislative intent as to whether this statute was to apply to incidental 
non-sex offenses protected under section 654 is at the very least, 
questionable.120 
Another important fact, stressed by the Hicks appellate court, that 
depicts the legislative intent behind section 667.6(c) was an analytical 
report of the original bill by the Senate Committee on Judiciary. The 
Senate Committee, in its analysis, questioned whether the author of 
section 667.6(c) "intended to 'mandate, in apparent disregard of Section 
654, multiple punishments for sexual offenses committed during a single 
transaction. '"121 This analysis "focused squarely on the potential 
conflict between section 654's prohibition against multiple punishment 
and the bill's apparent disregard of that section."122 The legislature, 
after examining the Committee's report, promptly amended the bill by 
deleting the phrase "single intent or objective."123 This course of 
events further implies that the legislature was not intending to create an 
exception to section 654. 124 The legislature was made aware of the 
120. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this author believes that section 
667.6(c) is limited to the sexual offenses listed, not to other offenses as the Jones court 
held. The legislature, in section 667.6(c) was only codifying the Perez holding, which 
held that multiple sexual criminal acts on a victim involve separate intents. Perez did 
not hold that non-sex offenses incidental to the sexual acts also carried separate intents 
or that these non-sex offenses should be punished as an exception to section 654. The 
legislature, in all likelihood, did not intend s.ection 667.6(c) to carry implications beyond 
the holding of Perez. · 
121. People v. Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th 88, 103, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 175 (1992) 
(subsequently depublished) (citing SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF s. 13, 
1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess., at S(as amended Mar. 5, 1979)). 
122. Id. at 104, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 175. 
123. Id. 
124. In the final modifications to. section 667.6(c) before being enacted, the 
legislature imposed a new subdivision, section 667.6(d). This subdivision imposes 
mandatory, rather than discretionary, full-term consecutive sentences "if the crimes 
involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions." CAL. PENAL 
CODE-§ 667.6(d) (West 1994). The phrase "separate occasions" has been defined by the 
legislature as an instance where "the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect 
upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior." Id. 
Moreover, whether the defendant "lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack" 
is not determinative by itself. Id. This definition sounds as if it could relate to separate 
intent. If it were to mean separate intent, then arguably the legislature was not 
codifying, in section 667.6(c), the principle that each sex offense in a series of sex 
offenses committed during a single transaction has a separate intent. However, the 
phrase "separate occasions" has not been interpreted to mean separate intents. See 
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conflicting interpretation it created and deleted the "single intent or 
objective" in order to make clear the statute's true purpose. 
2. Culpability 
The court's culpability argument was based on what it felt was the 
purpose behind the enactment of section 667.6(c). The court stated: 
"That statute was intended to allow enhanced punishment of certain 
sexual offenders who comm.it multiple offenses. [ citation omitted] Such 
increased penalties are appropriate, because a defendant who comm.its 'a 
number of base criminal acts on his victim. is substantially more culpable 
than a defendant who comm.its only one such act."125 Obviously, one 
of the purposes behind this statute was to punish a defendant in 
correlation with his culpability. One who comm.its several different 
sexual acts, often very violent acts, is arguably more culpable than a 
defendant who only comm.its one such act. 
However, the court's culpability argument runs afoul in the present 
case. In essence, the court is arguing that the burglary makes Hicks 
more culpable than if he did not comm.it the burglary. Granted, Hicks 
would have never been able to comm.it the sex offenses if he did not 
first comm.it the burglary. However, extending this argument to other 
criminal scenarios would virtually swallow the defendant-protecting 
limitations set forth in section 654 case law. Following the court's 
rationale, a defendant involved in a multiple crime situation not 
involving sex offenses would nevertheless be punished for every single 
crime com.m.itted which was incidental to the defendant's main intent and 
which was part of an indivisible course of conduct, even though 
punishment for these crimes would normally be prohibited by section 
654. The court conceded that the burglary was incidental and was only 
com.m.itted to facilitate the sexual crimes. This fact makes the culpabili-
ty argument run directly contrary to the protection of section 654. 
People v. Reeder, 152 Cal. App. 3d 900, 914-15, 200 Cal. Rptr. 479, 489-90 (1984) 
("the test for consecutive punishment under section 667.6, subdivision (d), is not whether 
a single transaction is divisible [indicating separate intent] but is rather whether the 
offenses occurred on occasions disjoined from each other') ( emphasis added). 
Having a separate intent and having the opportunity to reflect upon one's actions are 
arguably two different things. Or, put in another way, a separate act in a single 
transaction (section 667.6(c)) is different from a separate occasion (section 667.6(d)). 
125. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at477. 
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The following example may be useful to exemplify the court's flaw. 
The defendant in Neal v. California, 126 threw gasoline ori his victims 
and then ignited the gasoline in an attempt to murder the victims. The 
defendant was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one 
count of arson. 127 The court concluded that punishing for the arson 
was not allowed due to the restrictions set forth in section 654.128 The 
arson was considered, by the Neal court, as incidental to the defendant's 
main objective of murder, and therefore protected from punishment by 
section 654.129 Applying the Hicks rationale to the Neal fact scenario, 
the additional act of arson infers that the defendant is more culpable and 
should be punished for both crimes. 
The Hicks court's culpability argument does have truth and strength 
to it, but in a more limited sense. Section 667 .6( c) only lists sex 
offenses for which sentence enhancements can be invoked. The 
legislature, along with the precedent previously discussed, evidently 
believed that a defendant who commits several of these offenses on his 
victim is more culpable. However, for the legislature to believe that the 
other crimes incidental to the sex offenses make the defendant more 
culpable would be directly contrary to the legislature's belief and intent 
behind section 654. After all, the purpose behind section 654 's 
protection against multiple punishment is to "insure that a defendant's 
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability."130 
Arguably, a person who commits an offense, even though the crime 
was part of an indivisible course of conduct in committing the _main 
offense, is nonetheless more culpable than if he had never committed the 
incidental crime. For example, it is difficult to grasp the concept that a 
person committing bank robbery is not more culpable when he steals a 
car to carry out his robbery than if he had not stolen the car. But under 
the judicial extensions of section 654, the defendant might not be 
sentenced for the auto theft. 131 
Id. 
126. 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960). 
127. Id. at 15, 357 P.2d at 841, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 609.· 
128. Id. at 20, 357 P.2d at 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612. 
129. Id. Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated: 
In the instant case the arson was the means of perpetrating the crime of 
attempted murder. . . . The conviction for both arson and attempted murder 
violated Penal Code section 654, since the arson was merely incidental to the 
primary objective of killing [the victims]. Petitioner, therefore can only be 
punished for the more serious offense, which is attempted murder. 
130. People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 551, 591 P.2d 63, 67, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 
(1979). 
131. However, in this scenario, a prosecutor would probably succeed in proving a 
separate intent for the auto theft--significantly easier than proving a separate intent for 
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In spite of the argument above, the culpability argument regarding 
section 667.6(c) is still tenuous in its application. For instance, when 
invoking the majority rationale in Hicks, a person who rapes a woman 
out on the street and then burglarizes a home is no more culpable than 
a person who breaks into a home solely to commit a rape. Arguably, the 
defendant in the former scenario is much more culpable. "[A] person's 
criminal culpability requires a showing that he acted purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with 
respect to each material element of the offense."132 In the former 
scenario, the defendant is acting purposely as to both the rape and the 
burglary. He has a specific intent and objective to rape the victim, and 
he also has a specific intent and objective to burglarize a house. In the 
latter scenario the person is acting purposely in regard to the rape but, 
arguably, is acting less than purposely in regard to the burglary. 
3. Precedent 
Just over two months before the Hicks decision was handed down, the 
California Supreme Court decided People v. Latimer.133 In Latimer, 
the defendant kidnapped his victim for the purpose of taking her out to 
the desert to rape her. He brutally raped her twice. The trial court 
imposed sentences for both of the rapes and for the kidnapping.134 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court specifically refused to 
overrule the Neal decision.135 The court, following the Neal extension 
the burglary in Hicks. The defendant, deciding he wants to rob the bank, decides he 
needs a car to achieve this main purpose. Therefore, he decides he has to steal a car, 
committing another crime to achieve this purpose. Even though he knows a separate 
crime needs to be committed before achieving the robbery, he disjunctively decides to 
steal the car. In a Hicks type fact scenario, the sex offender could be strolling by a 
store, look in a window and see a woman, and walk in for the sole purpose of raping the 
woman. All he knows is that he wants to rape the woman and all he has to do to 
achieve this is to walk into the store with little to no thought as to whether he is 
committing a crime. 
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (6th ed. 1990) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(1)). 
133. 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 858 P.2d 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144 (1993). 
134. Id. at 1206, 858 P.2d at 613, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. The defendant was 
sentenced for six years for each rape conviction, five years for an infliction of great 
bodily injury conviction, and for a consecutive term of one year, eight months for the 
kidnapping conviction. The kidnapping term was one-third of the middle term that could 
be imposed for kidnapping. Id. 
135. Id. at 1205, 858 P.2d at 612, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. 
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of section 654, specifically held, "'Since the kidnapping was for the 
purpose of committing the sexual offenses and [defendant] has been 
punished for each of the sexual offenses,' section 654 bars execution of 
sentence on the kidnapping count."136 The court, even though criticiz-
ing the Neal rule, stated: 
The Neal rule . . . is far more pervasive; it has influenced so much subsequent 
legislation that stare decisis mandates adherence to it. It can effectively be 
overruled only in a comprehensive fashion, which is beyond the ability of this 
court. The remedy for any inadequacies in the current law must be left to the 
Legislature. 137 . 
The Latimer court held that when making decisions involving the Neal 
rule, the court should be cautious in rendering decisions that conflict 
with the Neal rule--the precise conflict that occurred in Hicks. The 
Latimer majority stated that the rationale behind their holding was based 
on the legislature's reliance on the Neal rule.138 
The court presented one instance applicable to the facts in Latimer in 
which the legislature relied on the Neal rule. The court quoted Penal 
Code section 667.8: "[A]ny person convicted of a felony violation of 
[rape] who, for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped 
the victim in violation of Section 207, shall be punished by an additional 
term of three years."139 In other words, if the defendant kidnaps his 
victim to commit one of the enumerated sex offenses listed in section 
667.8, an enhancement of three years will be imposed. However, section 
667 .8 was not invoked by the Latimer court because it "was neither pled 
nor proven" by the prosecution. 140 
136. Id. at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (alteration in original) 
(citing and quoting People v. Flores, 193 Cal. App. 3d 915, 921-22, 238 Cal. Rptr 656, 
659 (1987)). . 
137. Id., 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. Even though the court refused 
to overrule Neal, they did clarify that the Latimer holding was not intended to limit those 
cases "finding consecutive, and therefore separate, intents, and those finding different, 
if simultaneous, intents." Id. at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. 
138. The majority in Latimer noted that the legislature had not exactly relied on 
the Neal rule but then stated: "[T]he result for present purposes is the same as if there 
had been legislative reliance. The Legislature has enacted substantial legislation 
reflecting its acceptance of the Neal rule." Id. at 1214, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 151. 
In regard to Legislative reliance, the court explained: "'Stare decisis has added force 
when the legislature, in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted 
in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would 
dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response."' 
Id. at 1213-14, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (quoting Hilton v. South 
Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)). 
139. Id. at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. 
140. Id. Moreover, Latimer did not address section 667.6(c). Section 667.6(c) was 
most likely not raised by the prosecution. For further discussion of section 667.8, see 
312 
[VOL. 32: 285, 1995] People v. Hicks 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Latimer implicates major weaknesses in the Hicks decision. First, the 
Latimer court recognized the pervasiveness of and the deference that 
should be given to the Neal rule. The Hicks majority apparently 
disregarded this principle in analyzing section 667 .6( c ). As mentioned 
earlier, the Hicks majority stated: "The Legislature's reason for deleting 
from section 667.6(c) ... the phrase 'whether or not the crimes were 
committed· with a single intent or objective' . . . is not apparent."141 
Even though the legislature's reasoning was "not apparent," the Hicks 
majority nonetheless had little difficulty in finding that section 667 .6( c) 
created an exception to section 654 and, therefore, the Neal rule. The 
Hicks majority, if following the principles set, forth in their Latimer 
decision, should have deferred to the Neal interpretation of section 654 
and should not have found an exception created by section 667 .6( c ). 
Even though the Hicks court declined to find that section 667 .6( c) did 
not create an exception to section 654, the Hicks court should have at 
least concluded that the statute was ambiguous as to whether an 
exception was created and interpreted the statute in favor of the 
defendant. 142 The court, by doing this, would have been acting in an 
appropriate manner by leaving the exception issue to the legislature. As 
the Latimer court stated: "On a more general front, what. other statutes 
and legislative decisions may have been influenced by the Neal rule, and 
in what ways? These are questions the Legislature, not this court, is best 
equipped to answer."143 
Second, and more specifically, the Latimer decision essentially 
acknowledges the legislative relianc~ on the Neal rule in enacting 
infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
141. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 793, 863 P.2d 714, 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469, 
474 (1993). 
142. "When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used 
in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will 
be adopted." People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 599, 758 P.2d 1165, 1173, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
635,643 (1988) (citing People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814,828,633 P.2d 186, 193, 176 
Cal. Rptr. 521, 528 (1981). The Hicks court was mindful of this interpretation but 
concluded that only one reasonable interpretation existed. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 795-96, 
863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. For a discussion of the Hicks rationale 
regarding this issue, see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
143. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. 
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statutes. 144 As mentioned above, the court points to section 667 .8 to 
show the legislature's reliance. The court stated: 
[T]he Legislature was apparently aware that under the prevailing interpretation 
of section 654, consecutive sentences for a sexual offense and kidnapping would 
be impermissible if the sole purpose of the kidnapping was to facilitate the 
sexual offense. It accepted that interpretation ... and enacted the three-year 
enhancement of section 667.8 to remedy the problem.145 
Arguably, the legislature had the Neal rule in mind when enacting and 
reviewing the other penal code sections relating to sex offense sentenc-
ing, namely section 667.6(c). If this is the case, the legislature would 
not have omitted the language "single intent or objective" of the original 
version of section 667 .6( c ), the explicit terminology used in the Neal 
rule, if it intended to create an exception to section 654.146 
4. California Penal Code Section 667.8 
The Latimer court's reference to California Penal Code section 667 .8 
brings to mind other weaknesses regarding the Hicks interpretation of 
section 667 .6( c ). One fl.aw in the court's interpretation of section 
667 .6( c) is apparent when looking at the language used in section 667 .8. 
How is it so simple for the Hicks court to find that the ambiguous 
wording of section 667.6(c) creates an exception to section 654, when 
the legislature, in section 667 .8, has specifically created, in clear and 
concise terms, exceptions to section 654 for certain non-sex offenses 
incidental to sex crimes? 
The answer to this question is simple--the Hicks court incorrectly 
interpreted section 667.6(c). As previously noted, Penal Code section 
667.8 states, in pertinent part, "[A]ny person convicted of a felony 
violation of Section 261 [rape], 264.1 [Rape/penetration by a foreign 
object with force or violence], 286'[sodomy], 288a [oral copulation], or 
289 [penetration by foreign object] who,for the purpose of committing 
that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207, 
144. The Latimer court states: 
Here, the Legislature has not exactly relied on the Neal rule, since it had the 
power to overrule it. It has also never expressly endorsed it. Rather, it has 
essentially accepted it, perhaps out of a belief that courts are best suited to 
analyze double-punishment questions. But the result for present purposes is 
the same as if there had been legislative reliance. 
Id. at 1214, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. 
146. Latimer reinforces the author's argument set forth in Part V(B)(l) entitled 
"Statutory Interpretation" regarding why the legislature may have deleted the phrase 
"single intent or objective." See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
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shall be punished by an additional term of three years."147 The 
legislature, in this statute, has referred to the Neal interpretation of 
section 654 through its language "for the purpose of committing that 
sexual offense" and has therefore created an exception to section 
654.148 Arguably, the legislature would have been more specific in 
section 667. 6( c ), possibly invoking language similar to that of section 
667.8, if it actually intended to create an exception to section 654 
regarding non-sex offenses. Justice George, in his Hicks opinion, 
neglected to acknowledge the significant implications that section 667 .8 
has on the interpretation of section 667 .6( c ).149 
A second weakness is that a defendant could theoretically be sentenced 
under both section 667.6(c) and section 667.8. Granted, section 654 
could possibly restrict the sentencing to only one sentence being 
imposed. However, following the Hicks interpretation of section 
667.6(c) and the Latimer interpretation of section 667.8, both of these 
sections are outside the scope of section 654. This leaves the sentencing 
judge with a dilemma. When a judge is sentencing a defendant, he is 
required to impose at least a three year kidnapping term under section 
667 .8. If the judge, in his or her discretion, determines that a full-term 
should be imposed for the kidnapping under section 667 .6( c ), what 
should be the total sentence? Can the judge only impose a term 
equivalent to what a full-term would be minus the three year mandated 
term or can the judge just add the full-term from section 667.6(c) to the 
three-year term of section 667.8?150 If the judge can only impose the 
147. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.8(a) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Subdivision (b) 
of section 667.8 contains similar language but applies to children under the age of 14 
who are kidnapped for the purpose of the sex offense. The sentence enhancement under 
these circumstances is nine years. Id. § 667.8(b). 
148. In People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P.2d 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850 
(1988), the California Supreme Court stated: "[T]he additional term to be imposed under 
section 667.8 was originally designed to eliminate the partial sentence reduction that 
might be gained by application of . . . the prohibition against multiple punishment 
contained in section 654 (if the kidnapping and sex offense were part of one indivisible 
course of conduct)." Id. at 203, 757 P.2d at 1017, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 854. 
149. Justice George, in Hicks, does refer to section 667.8 when addressing the 
appellate court's rationale in prohibiting the burglary sentence. See infra note 151. 
However, he does not acknowledge that the language used in section 667.8 may indicate 
an interpretation of section 667.6(c) contrary to that of the Hicks majority. 
150. For example, as in the Latimer case, a defendant was charged on two counts 
of rape and one count of kidnapping. He was sentenced for the upper term of eight 
years on each rape count. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 264 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The 
315 
difference between the discretionary full-term and the three year 
mandated term, why does section 667.6(c) not include limiting language 
to this effect? Attempting to find consistent answers to these inquiries 
depicts the inconsistencies of the Hicks decision. 151 
VI. EFFECTS OF HICKS 
The Hicks decision has one obvious effect on the criminal justice 
system: courts will be permitted to impose full, consecutive sentences on 
sex offenders that never have been allowed in the past. If the general 
public were surveyed as to the reaction to this result, most likely a large 
percentage would be elated to see criminal sex offenders spend more 
time in prison.152 
However, two other effects of Hicks are more troubling in spite of the 
strong abhorrence toward sex offenders. First, as discussed in Part V, 
Hicks could create several anomalous situations in the future. As 
discussed above, how section 667.8, concerning kidnapping, will interact 
full term of a kidnapping count also carries a sentence of eight years. See CAL. PENAL 
CODE§ 208 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The judge, governed by sections 667.6(c) and 
667.8, would have to determine which of the following sentences would be allowed: 
I) Imposing an enhanced sentence of three years, according to section 667.8, with an 
additional full, consecutive term, invoking section 667.6(c), but then subtracting the 
enhancement, leaving a total of five years. Notice this sentencing choice runs contrary 
to the language of section 667.6(c) which allows a "full, separate, and consecutive term" 
because it is not a full eight-year consecutive term, but only a five-year consecutive 
term. 
2) Imposing a three-year enhancement under section 667.8 and imposing an eight-year 
consecutive full-term under section 667.6(c). This would normally encounter section 654 
limitations. However, section 654's prohibitions in this area are uncertain in light of 
Hicks. • 
3) Choosing only one of the statutes and imposing that term. However, would the 
judge have a choice? After all, the judge is required under section 667.8 to impose a 
three-year enhancement. 
The Hicks majority claimed to be hearing the case to clear up the sentencing conflicts 
among the lower courts. However, as the above problem illustrates, in essence, the 
court's holding and rationale have created more conflicts. 
151. Justice George, in his Hicks opinion, did briefly address this dual sentencing 
interpretation that may create inconsistencies. First, he stated that the court had no 
opinion as to whether the legislature intended to allow cumulative sentencing by utilizing 
both sections 667.6(c) and 667.8. Justice George then stated that if the legislature did 
not intend to allow sentencing under both statutes, the court "[ c ]ould effectuate such a 
legislative intent simply by holding that a defendant could not receive both a section 
667.8 enhancement and consecutive full-term sentences under section 667.6(c) based 
upon the same offenses." Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 795, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 476 n.8. This would appear to clear up the inconsistencies by invoking section 654 
to prohibit both sentencing statutes to be invoked simultaneously. 
152. In 1990, the probability of a defendant receiving a prison term for a rape 
conviction was only 53%. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,-
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1990, at 15 (1993). 
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with section 667.6(c) is one such situation. 153 Also, on a more general 
level, the section 667.8/section 667.6(c) situation is creating more 
inconsistencies and confusion in the sentencing procedure the courts are 
to follow-an area the criminal justice system is attempting to stream-
line.154 Another anomalous situation could arise where a defendant 
commits multiple incidental non-sex offenses in pursuing one sex 
offense, such as rape.155 Following the Hicks decision, consecutive 
full-term sentences for all of the crimes would be imposed. Multiple 
sentencing in this situation may significantly diverge from the making 
statutes' purposes of makings sentences commensurate with the 
defendant's culpability. 
A second troubling effect of the Hicks decision, the court's disregard 
for established statutory rules of construction and its use of legislative 
type powers, could infiltrate areas beyond the sex offender sentencing 
realm. The judiciary has limits in what it can do in interpreting statutes. 
A court's duty is to reasonably interpret the legislative intent in a 
statute. 156 As previously discussed, if, in a penal code statute, two 
reasonable interpretations can be drawn from the statute, the interpreta-
tion most favorable to the defendant should be invoked. As the prior 
analysis of the Hicks decision indicates-if giving the benefit of the 
doubt to the court-two reasonable interpretations can nonetheless be 
153. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
154. For commentary regarding reforming sentencing laws, see generally Paul H. 
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
155. Consider the following: A defendant entered the victim's house, took the 
victim to the garage and put the victim in her car, and then drove off with the victim so 
he could rape her. The defendant then leaves the scene by foot. Under this 
hypothetical, the defendant could probably be convicted of burglary, robbery, 
kidnapping, and rape. In light of Hicks, even though the burglary, robbery, and 
kidnapping were all committed for the purpose of committing one sexual offense, the 
rape, the defendant could nonetheless be given consecutive full-term sentences for all 
three crimes, in addition to a full-term sentence for the rape. 
If, on the other hand, the defendant committed the burglary, robbery, and the 
kidnapping for the sole purpose of a non-sexual, physical assault, the defendant would 
most likely only be sentenced for the physical assault because of section 654's 
limitations. 
156. "The quest for legislative intent is not unbounded: 'It still remains true, as it 
always has, that there can be no intent in a statute not expressed in its words, and there 
can be no intent upon the part of the framers of such a statute which does not find 
expression in words."' City of Sacramento v. Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 545, 548 (1994) (citing and quoting Ex parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 416-17, 
117 P. 451, 454 (1911)). 
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drawn from section 667 .6( c ). The court disregarded this principle to 
reach its desired conclusion. This is an abuse of judicial power that, if 
the court can commit without criticism, may inspire the court to carry 
this abuse into other criminal statutory interpretations. If one were not 
to give the· Hicks court the benefit of the doubt and conclude that the 
court's interpretation is directly contrary to what the legislature intended, 
the court has then stepped over the line and infringed on powers 
specifically reserved for the legislature.157 The court is replacing the 
legislature's intent with its own desired interpretation.158 This type of 
action erodes the distinction between those roles reserved for the 
judiciary and those reserved for the legislature. 
VIL CONCLUSION 
The Hicks decision, to many, is probably seen as a step in the right 
direction in the punishment of sex offenders. Many people, particularly 
the victims, probably feel a sex offender can never be put away long 
enough. This Note's position is not that sex offenders should never 
receive increased sentences for their incidental crimes. Rather, the 
statutory sentencing scheme, created by the powers vested in the 
legislature, should be adhered to by the court, rather than deviated from 
to create a scheme that the court deems fit. In other words, the 
legislature should make the decision to increase sentences, or, more 
specifically, to create an exception to section 654 via section 667 .6( c ). 
The Hicks court abused its powers and created precedent for a future 
wave of longer sentences in criminal sex offense cases.159 Hicks was 
the perfect case for the California Supreme Court with which to make 
the transition. After all, Eric Tomont Hicks already had an uncontested 
eighty year sentence to serve. The three year burglary sentence was 
basically insignificant when compared with the full sentence. The only 
157. The California Code of Civil Procedure states: 
In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply 
to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not 
to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where 
there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, 
to be adopted as will give effect to all. 
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). 
158. The Hicks majority may argue that because the legislature has not responded 
to this holding, the court reached a conclusion consistent with the legislature. However, 
as the Latimer court stated: "We have recognized that legislative inaction alone does 
not necessarily imply legislative approval." Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1213, 858 P.2d at 
618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151. 
159. The California Supreme Court's Jones decision is another foundational case 
for imposing longer sentences. People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d, 585, 758 P.2d 1165, 250 
Cal. Rptr. 636 (1988). 
318 
[VOL. 32: 285, 1995] People v. Hicks 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the California Supreme 
Court's decision to use its judicial resources to tack on another three 
years to Hicks' sentence is that the court was achieving the broader 
purpose of creating a harsher punishment for sex offenders of the 
future. 160 Justice Mosk summed up the Hicks majority's opinion most 
accurately: "A sentence like the one imposed here, that cannot possibly 
be completed in the defendant's lifetime, makes a mockery of the law 
,,161 
MICHAEL A. BARMETTLER 
160. Hicks, because of the numerous crimes committed and the manner in which 
they were committed, was the perfect case for the California Supreme Court to achieve 
this purpose. As the trial court judge imposing the sentences stated: "As far as I'm 
concerned, this is one of the most egregious cases." People v. Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th 
88, 99, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 172 (1992) (subsequently depublished). 
161. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 797, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. 
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